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     1.  Introduction 
 
This paper proposes an extension of the concept of coalition stability introduced by 
d’Aspremont et al. (1983) in a non-cooperative framework. With that concept, a coalition is 
considered to be stable if none of its members has an incentive to withdraw (this is known as 
internal stability) and none of the non-members has an incentive to participate in the coalition 
(this is known as external stability). This concept has been used to study, among other issues, 
the formation of cartels (d'Aspremont et al., 1983; Donsimoni et al., 1986; d'Aspremont and 
Gabszewicz, 1986, and others), international environmental agreements (Carraro and 
Siniscalco, 1993; Barrett, 1994, and others) or trade unions (e.g, Baldwin, 1995). However, 
these papers typically assume that all agents are identical. This implies that the payoffs 
obtained by all members of the coalition are identical and, in addition, that the payoff 
obtained by the agents outside of the coalition are also identical. In fact, the payoffs obtained 
depend only on the size of the coalition and not on its composition. Thus, if an agent benefits 
from joining the coalition, no member of the coalition will find it beneficial to deviate. This 
is, however, not valid any more in the asymmetrical case: an initially externally unstable 
coalition (in d’Aspremont et al.’s (1983) sense) can be internally unstable when it integrates a 
new agent from the fringe.  
The goal of this article is to propose an adaptation of these concepts to contexts where 
agents are heterogeneous. We propose to define external stability based on the property of 
internal stability of a coalition with one more member. That is, we say that a coalition is 
externally stable if any marginal enlargement would lead to an internally unstable coalition. 
Thus, we give conditions under which, after the enlargement, a decrease in the individual 
payoff of a former member of the coalition is a sufficient condition for the instability of the 
extended coalition (i.e. for the failure of the enlargement). We also define two sets of agents 
on which to focus the analysis to study the stability of a given coalition: the “exchanging” and 
the “refractory agents”. The former “envy” a position outside of the coalition to which they 
belong, that is, they would like to be replaced within the coalition. We show that this set is 
related to difficulties in finding members willing to participate in the coalition, due to free-
rider behaviors (incentives to prefer that others participate in the coalition instead of 
participating yourself). On the other hand, the refractory agents would not like to see a 
particular agent joining their coalition. We show that in an heterogeneous context, refraction 
does not imply deviation, making the connections between refraction and deviation interesting 
while analyzing the external stability of coalitions. As shown below, these subsets also prove 
to be useful to explain traditional concerns in industrial economics. 
There are a number of solution concepts proposed to determine the size of a stable 
coalition in the presence of heterogeneous agents. Among others, the quasi-hybrid equilibrium 
(Zhao, 1992), the largest consistent set (Chwe, 1994), the equilibrium binding agreements 
(Ray and Vohra, 1997), the farsightedly stable set (Herings et al., 2010) or the optimal sharing 
rule (Weikard, 2009). A first difference among our approach, and more generally the 
framework of d’Aspremont et al. (1983), and most of these approaches is that we are in a 
fully non-cooperative framework while these papers combine cooperative and non-
cooperative concepts (see Xue (1998)). Another difference is that we remain in a static 
framework and that we do not assume that agents are perfectly farsighted (as in Chwe (1994) 
or in Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2004); see Xue (1998) for a discussion of different types 
of farsightedness). Farsightedness is a nice feature, but assuming it with no-limit is probably a 
strong assumption in many settings (our framework implies limited farsightedness). Weikard 
(2009) is closely related to our paper since he works directly with the stability concept of 
d’Aspremont et al. (1983), although he keeps the original definition and adds the assumption 
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 that payoffs are shared using an “optimal sharing rule” (he obtains results for coalitions with 
negative spillovers and for a particular class of coalitions with positive spillovers). Finally, 
our analysis shares with d’Aspremont et al.  (1983) what is probably its main strength and 
what explains that it is still popular in applications: it is simple. In addition, by defining the 
“exchanging” and the “refractory” sets we allow the analyst to focus on the main players that 
will drive the stability of a given coalition.  
 
2.  The framework 
 
Let N = {1..., n} be all the agents, assumed to be heterogeneous, bargaining to coordinate 
their behavior. Let  = {1, …, p} be the subset of p agents forming a cooperating coalition 
( N) and  = {p+1, …, n} the complementary in N. We call the latter set a fringe of q = 
n-p agents. The partition   defines a coalition structure. We suppose that for any 
coalition structure  , a system of payoffs exists that uniquely determines a payoff 
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We call an agent i∈ p C
p−
 a deviating member of the coalition if i obtains a higher payoff in 
the coalition structure   than in  , i.e  < . Internal and 
external stability of a coalition is analyzed considering only individual moves from the 
coalition towards the fringe, or from the fringe towards the coalition. The set of all deviating 
members is denoted by: 
{} {}] i F , i q∪ C [ ] F , C [ q p ip (C ) π ip (C {i}) π−
) C ( D p =  {} { } ) i C ( ) C ( , C i p i p i p − π < π ∈ . 
With homogeneous agents (as in d’Aspremont et al. (1983)), a coalition is internally 
stable if its size cannot decrease, and it is externally stable if its size cannot increase. The 
study of the stability of a coalition consists only in the determination of the ‘stable’ size of the 
coalition. As long as this size remains constant, one can change the identity of its members 
without having any effect on its internal or external stability. 
With heterogeneous agents, a coalition of any given size can be stable or unstable 
according to the identity of its members. In an asymmetrical framework, the incentive to join 
or leave a coalition can indeed be different from an agent to another. Thus, we define the 
stability of the coalition   using the sets   and  p C ) C ( D p {} ) j C ( D p∪ , where j indicates an agent of 
the fringe: 
 
Definition 1.  
The cooperating coalition   is stable if:  p C
1-  For each i∈ p C ,  ip (C {i}) π−≤  ip (C ) π  (i.e.  ) C ( D p =∅ ) and  
2-  for each j∈ q F ,  <  ( i.e. for any agent j q F kp (C {j}) π∪ kp ((C {j}) {k}) π∪ − ∈ : 
{}) j C ( D p∪ ≠ ∅ ). 
 
Condition (1) is the traditional definition of internal stability. Condition (2) defines external 
stability of a coalition by the internal instability of any coalition enlarged by one agent.  
By including (2) in the definition, the concepts of stability defined by d’Aspremont et al. 
(1983) is applicable to asymmetrical contexts, as described in the introduction. This new 
definition of external stability takes into account two possibilities:  
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 (a) The entry in the coalition is not advantageous for any agent of the fringe. This is the 
case analyzed for identical agents by d'Aspremont et al. (1983).  
(b) The entry in the coalition is advantageous for an agent of the fringe, but involves the 
defection of an agent initially belonging to the coalition.  
Now the members of a coalition have the possibility of leaving it after the adhesion of a new 
member. Thus, a coalition is externally stable when all the possible negotiations for its 
enlargement failed. 
Definition (1) describes an open membership game, i.e. each player is free to join and to 
leave the coalition without the consensus of the other members of the coalition (d'Aspremont 
et al., 1983; Yi and Shin, 2000). Each player announces a message, and all the players who 
announce the same  message form a coalition. Thus, this membership rule implies that a 
coalition accepts any new player who wants to join it. 
However, to analyze the external stability of a coalition with heterogeneous agents we 
need to take into account the characteristics of q sets  {}) j C ( D p∪  (j = p+1, …, n). We have to 
compare: (a) the payoff that any player j∈ q F  obtains in   with the payoff he obtains in 
 and, (b) the payoff that any player i
] F , C [ q p
{} {}] j F , j C [ q p − ∪ ∈ p C  gets in  {}{ } ] j F , j C [ q p − ∪  compared to 
. Let us note that if a coalition is stable with d'Aspremont et al.’s 
(1983) concept, it is also stable using definition (1), whilst the reciprocal is not true.  
{} {} F ( , j ) i C [( p ∪ − {} {}] i ) j q ∪ −
 
3.  Exchanging and internal stability 
 
The possible existence of multiple equilibria in the preceding game, which would imply 
several stable coalitions, may complicate coalition formation analysis. This multiplicity can 
take two forms: (a) several stable cooperating coalitions of different sizes, or (b) several stable 
cooperating coalitions of the same size.  
Existence of several stable coalitions with the same number of participants implies 
interchangeability of certain members of a stable coalition with certain members of the fringe. 
However, a member of a coalition is not necessarily interested in changing his place with a 
member of the fringe. To discuss this issue in more detail, we define the following set (for any 
coalition   of size p and for any agent j member of the fringe  ):    p C q F
) C ( S p j =  {} {} { } ] i ) j C [( ) C ( , C i p i p i p − ∪ π < π ∈ . 
This set contains all the agents of the cooperating coalition who would prefer to exchange 
their place with agent j of the fringe. We call them “exchanging” agents with j. This 
exchanging phenomenon implies that there was an incentive for agent i not to become a 
candidate to the formation of the p size coalition when   had already been formed. It also 
implies difficulties for the formation of the coalition of size p in a former phase. 
1 p C −
To illustrate this concept, let us consider the following gameΓ. This game has four 
players (subscripted i = 1, 2, 3, 4) and is represented by the payoff matrix shown in Table (1), 









 Table (1). Game 
1  Γ  
Payoff 
Structure 
1 π                              2 π 3 π 4 π  
[{1}, {2}, {3}, {4}]      0            0             0           0  
[{1,2},3,4]      1            α            2           1 
[{1,3},2,4]      1            β            4           2 
[{1,4},2,3]      1            β            1           1 
[{2,4},1,3]      1/2          1            1           1            
[{2,3},1,4]      δ            1            3           3 
[{1,2,3},4]      3/2          2            3           4 
 
Notation [{1,2},3,4] means that players 1 and 2 form a coalition while players 3 and 4 stay as 
singletons. Columns  1 π , …,   represent the respective payoffs of each of the four players 
according to the given coalition structures. This game is very schematic, but with small 
variations it can represent the formation of a cartel, the adoption of an international 
environmental agreement or the creation of a trade union (see the references mentioned in the 
introduction). For an analysis using directly a more detailed version of the game presented 
here see Daidj and Hammoudi (2010) for the video sector or Giraud-Héraud et al. (1998) for 
international trade.  
4 π
We can characterize the set  as follows:  {} ) 2 , 1 ( S3
{} 3 S(1 , 2 )= {1}    if   α>β and δ>1 
{1,2}    if      α<β and δ>1 
{2}    if      α<β and δ<1 
∅      if    α>β and δ<1. 
The exchanging concept formalizes the idea that a member of the coalition could wish to 
exchange his place with an unspecified agent of the fringe, and that this wish constitutes a 
sign of deviation. However, it is not sure that this incentive for exchanging would 
automatically imply an incentive to deviate. If we assume 0<α<β and  >1 in game  δ Γ, 
={1,2}≠  and  {} ) 2 , 1 ( S3 ∅ {} { }) 2 , 1 ( D ) 2 , 1 ( S3 ∩ =∅ . The issue raised here is the connection 
between the incentive to exchange and the incentive to deviate, i.e the impact of non-vacuity 
of   on the internal stability of  .  ) C ( S p j p C
While a potential deviator compares his payoff inside the coalition with his payoff 
outside (without any further modification of the structure  ), the exchanger compares 
his payoff inside and outside by keeping the size p of the coalition unchanged.  
] F , C [ q p
Let us define: 
) C ( O p j =  {} {} {} { } pi p i p iC , ( C i) ( ( C i) j ) ∈π− < π −∪ . 
This set contains the members which would prefer to see agent j joining the coalition if 
they decide unilaterally to leave the coalition. By using this set, proposition 1 shows the 
connections between exchanging and deviating:   
 
Proposition 1.  
For any agent  j∈ ,, the following properties are satisfied:    q F
                                                 
1 The game used is incomplete because the remaining cases (not stated) are not relevant for the discussion. 
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 ) C ( O p j ∩ ) C ( D p ⊂ ) C ( S p j         (1) 
) C ( S p j \  .        (2)  jp O( C)⊂ ) C ( D p
Proof.  Directly from the notation in (1) and (2). 
 
To understand the relevance of this proposition, we have to compare it to Stigler’s (1950) 
argument on intrinsic instability of collusions, given the higher payoffs obtained by agents 
which are not involved in the process. Let us suppose that an agent i of the fringe joins  , 
and call the new coalition of size p: 
1 p C −
{} i C 1 p ∪ −  (= ). For an agent i p C ∈ p C  and for an agent 
j∈ , we now consider the properties:    q F
) C ( p i π <         ( P 1 )   jq (F ) π
) C ( p i π <  .       (P2)  {} {}] i ) j C [( p i − ∪ π
Property (P1) means that for a given size of the coalition, the payoff of an agent of the 
fringe is higher than the payoff of a member of the coalition. This property can be seen as a 
first interpretation of Stigler’s remark (1950). It constitutes the main cause of collusion failure 
when a great number of identical agents exist in the economy, so that an agent of the coalition 
can get the payoff obtained in the fringe. However, if there are a limited number of agents, a 
marginal variation in the size of the coalition (or of the fringe) is likely to modify significantly 
the outcome of the game. This is why we propose to reason with an invariant size of the 
coalition so as to analyze Stigler’s conjecture in a context where the number of players is not 
excessive.  
Property (P2) simply states that agent i is an exchanger with agent j of the fringe. In a 
homogeneous model, the sets   and   coincide for any agent j of the fringe if and only 
if property (P1) is satisfied by all agents in the game. 
p C ) C ( S p j
Proposition (1) can be seen as the condition validating Stigler’s argument, since we 
characterize situations where the difficulties observed during the coalition formation 
predetermine its instability. Assertion (1) characterizes cases where the deviation of a member 
of the coalition is not related to the exchanging phenomena. Thus, if there is a member i who 
is deviating from   and who is not an exchanger with a member j of the fringe, then i is not 
part of  . Assertion (2) gives a sufficient condition for the instability of a coalition that 
had problems in its formation process ( \
p C
) C ( O p j
) C ( S p j )) C ( O ) C ( S ( p j p j ∩ ≠ ∅). Under this condition, the 
exchangers with one or more agents of the fringe will be potential deviators. They are thus an 
intrinsic cause of internal instability of the coalition. We can now formulate the following 
corollary, which provides another interpretation of assertion (2): 
 
Corollary 1.   
If a cooperating coalition   is internally stable, then:  p C ∀j∈ q F   .  ) C ( S p j ⊆ ) C ( O p j
Proof.   
If   is internally stable,  = .   p C ) C ( D p ∅
 Thus, according to (ii), we have:  \  =  ) C ( S p j )) C ( O ) C ( S ( p j p j ∩ ∅ . 
Hence: { } jp jp jp i , iS ( C ) , iS ( C ) O ( C ) ∈∈ ∩ =∅ , which implies:  . ■  ) C ( S p j ⊆ ) C ( O p j
 
Corollary (1) gives a necessary condition for internal stability of a coalition that had 
formation problems, in the sense of a lack of candidates. A coalition including exchanging 
agents with an external agent j is internally stable only if these agents belong to the set 
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 ) C ( O p j . Hence,   is at the heart of the discussion on the deviating signals likely to be 
produced by exchanging agents
) C ( O p j
2.  
Let us characterize (in game Γ) the set  { }) 2 , 1 ( O3 : 
{} ) 2 , 1 ( O3 = {1}  if   β < 0 and δ> 0 
{1,2}    if   β > 0 and δ> 0 
{2}    if   β > 0 and δ< 0 
∅     if   β < 0 and δ< 0. 
If   > 0 and   < 0, set   does not contain agent 1:  the cooperation of agent 3 
with agent 2 generates a negative externality on agent 1, who remained in the fringe. On the 
other hand, in this case we have 
β δ {} ) 2 , 1 ( O3
{ }) 2 , 1 ( O4 ={1,2}. In other words, when agent 1 leaves 
coalition {1,2}, he prefers coalition {2,3} not to be formed, but he finds the formation of 
coalition {2,4} advantageous.  
In homogeneous models, the characterization of   is trivial. For any coalition  :   ) C ( O p j p C
[∀j∈   =  ]  q F ) C ( O p j p C ⇔  [ < ) 1 p ( F − π ) p ( F π ]. 
Either   is empty, either it contains all the members of the coalition. In particular, if 
the welfare of the fringe is an increasing function of the size p of the coalition, we have 
systematically  =   for any coalition and any member j of the coalition.  In addition, if 
property (P1) is checked (and all the agents of the coalition are exchangers), assertion (1) tells 
us that if  , then the coalition is internally unstable. Hence, in the case of identical 
agents whose payoffs are higher in the fringe than in the coalition, and if an internally stable 
coalition exists, an increase in the size of the coalition is always beneficial to agents who have 
remained independent. That is the result obtained by Barrett (1994) in his analysis of 
international environmental agreements. 
) C ( O p j
( Oj





4.  Refraction and external stability 
 
Let us consider henceforth the possibilities of enlargement of a coalition to new 
members. With heterogeneous agents, the entry of a new member in the cooperating coalition 
does not necessarily increase the payoff of all the former members. However, those who see 
their payoff decrease will not necessarily deviate within an extended coalition. In practice, the 
effect of this entry on the payoffs of the members of the coalition can vary in a more or less 
significant way, according to the characteristics of its members and of the newcomers.  
We call a ‘refractory member’ to the entrance of j∈ q F in the coalition, any agent i∈ p C  
who gets a higher payoff in   than in  ] F , C [ q p {} {}] j j C [ p∪ F , q− . We note   the set of 
refractory members to the entrance
) C ( R p j
3 of j :  ∈ q F
                                                 
2 The set   can be empty in an economic sector where the formation of a coalition implies weakening 
competitors (e.g. when a cartel increases competition due to changes in firms’ efficiency).  If the formation of a 
coalition implies technology-sharing which tends to reduce costs, the intensification of competition resulting 
from cooperation could prove disastrous for firms which have remained independent. In the sequential analysis 
of coalition formation proposed by Bloch (1995), the non-cooperative equilibrium generates a reduction in 
profits for the firms that did not join the R&D coalition (this property holds for quantity and for price 
competition). 
) C ( O p j
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 ) C ( R p j =  {} { } ) C ( ) j C ( , C i p i p i p π < ∪ π ∈ . 
This set of refractory members was not taken into account in the definition of external 
stability (see definition (1)). The distinction between stability of the extended coalition and 
refraction is based on the assumption that the former members do not have the right to choose 
the future components of the coalition. Thus, our approach to the enlargement of the 
cooperating coalition neglects the idea of optimality in the choice of allies, since players do 
not choose their partners explicitly. The counterpart is that their decision to cooperate does 
not imply any commitment: the players may leave the coalition at any time. Refraction blocks 
the extension of the coalition if it goes together with an effective incentive for deviation. 
Proposition (2) shows how the characterization of the exchangers set makes it possible to 
establish direct connections between refraction and deviation in the extended coalition. 
 
Proposition 2 
For any agent j∈ , we have:  q F
) C ( S p j ∩ ) C ( R p j ⊂ {}) j C ( D p∪      (3) 
[\() pj p CS C ] ∩ {}) j C ( D p∪ ⊂ ) C ( R p j .       (4) 
Proof.  Directly from the writing of conditions (3) and (4). 
 
To have a refractory agent i blocking the enlargement of the coalition to an agent j, we need 
only him to be an exchanger with j (assertion (3)). The refractory agent can threaten the 
coalition by announcing his deviation after the enlargement, and this threat is credible since it 
is the best action he can take. Assertion (4) gives a sufficient condition to ensure that a 
deviating agent of the extended coalition is a refractory member to the entry of an agent j of 
the fringe. For this, we only need that the agent is not an exchanger with j. Thus, the relation 
between refractory and external agents allows us to deduce external stability of a coalition. 
 
Corollary 2.  
If ∀j∈   , then coalition   is externally stable.  q F ) C ( S p j ∩ ) C ( R p j ≠ ∅ p C
 
Corollary (2) is a sufficient condition for external stability of a coalition, based on the 
existence of members that are both not candidates to its formation and refractory to its 
enlargement. In other words, a coalition that is extended to an agent j of the fringe, in spite of 
the refraction of certain members, is a coalition whose members are happy to belong to it (in 
the sense that they are not willing to exchange their place with j). 
Let us come back to game  .  If   Γ α> 2, β < 2 and  δ< 3/2, the coalition {1,2} is 
externally unstable. Indeed, it can integrate agent 3  { }) ) 3 , 2 , 1 ( D ( ∅ =  even though agent 2 is 
refractory to its enlargement.  Corollary (2) tells us that this enlargement is possible in spite of 
the refraction of agent 2 because this agent is not an exchanger with agent 3 of the fringe
4.  
One can also show that the reciprocal corollary is not true.  To see that, set 2<β<α and δ< 1. 
In this case, coalition {1,2} cannot be enlarged by the integration of agent 3, although 
=  since  = {} {} ) 2 , 1 ( R ) 2 , 1 ( S 3 3 ∩ ∅ { , 1 ( S3 } ) 2 ∅ . 
                                                                                                                                                         
Γ
α {} ) 2 , 1 ( R3
3 In game  , if α >2, agent 2 is the only refractory to the entry of agent 3 in the coalition {1,2 }.  On the other 
hand, if < 2, the set   is empty. 
4 Which is the case, since = {1} for 1< {} ) 2 , 1 ( S3 δ < 3/2 and  { }) 2 , 1 ( S3 = ∅ if δ < 1, and hence 2∉ .  {} ) 2 , 1 ( S3
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 Thus, our analysis of external stability in the presence of heterogeneous agents explicitly 
poses the problem of refraction compared to external stability. In terms of the general theory 
of coalition formation, the concept of individually stable equilibrium of Greenberg (1977) is 
closely related to the criterion of refraction as long as the set of achievable payoff vectors for 
the coalition is restricted to  . However, this criterion reduces the independence of 
the agents belonging to the cooperating coalition. Indeed, this approach gives the members an 
exogenous right of veto, in addition to their basic right to choose their individual action (i.e. 
destabilization of the coalition by deviation). This is in contradiction with the concept of 
coalition itself. Thus, we neglect this possibility.  
] ) C ( [
p C i p i ∈ π
With identical agents, if one member of the coalition is refractory to new membership, all 
the members are.  Moreover, if property (P1) is satisfied, the refraction is enough to block the 
extension of the coalition ( ) C ( R p j ⊂ {}) j C ( D p∪ ), since  ) p ( C π < ) p ( F π . External stability of the 
coalition results from the incentive of the members of the fringe to join it. This last point 
explains why the concepts of refraction and deviation have not appeared in the literature as 
independent factors of analysis of external stability. 
Proposition (1) and (2) enable us to characterize the cases for which stable coalitions can 
be established in spite of non-refraction of its members to its extension. The answer to this 
question highlights the role of   (j ) C ( O p j ∈ q F ).  We can write the following corollary:  
 
Corollary 3. 
If   is stable and for j p C ∈ q F ,  = ) C ( R p j ∅ , then  = .  ) C ( O p j p C
 
That is, if for any agent j of the fringe,  =  and  ) C ( O p j p C ) C ( R p j ≠ ∅ , coalition   is 
necessarily unstable. In other words, given the negative external effects of concentration on 
outsiders, refraction is an indicator of the inexistence of stable coalitions. 
p C
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
We have adapted the concept of internal and external stability to a framework with 
heterogeneous agents. We have also defined two sets of agents on which to focus the analysis 
to study the stability of a given coalition: the “exchanging” and the “refractory agents”. 
Analyzing the properties of these sets in an homogeneous and in heterogeneous framework, 
we have shown that these sets highlight the difficulties encountered in adapting the classical 
concept of stability to an asymmetric context.  
Two fundamental points come out from our analysis. First, we have shown that the 
existence of heterogeneous agents imposes an individualized analysis of their incentives to 
join the fringe. We have highlighted that the stability of a cooperating coalition cannot be 
analyzed studying only the ex-post possibilities of deviation of its members, since their 
propensity to exchange is also relevant. The definition of the exchanging agents’ set 
constitutes a reasonable interpretation of Stigler’s (1950) argument on the destabilization of a 
given coalition. In addition, our approach implies reconsidering the traditional concept of 
external stability. With exchanging agents, refraction can be seen as a sufficient condition for 
the failure of an enlargement. Hence, problems associated with the formation of a coalition 
can have direct impacts not only on its internal stability but also on the future options of 
enlargement.  
8 
 Second, our paper offers some conclusions on the issue of the enlargement of a coalition 
by means of monetary transfers between its members. Under the assumption of sovereign 
agents, a non-deviating refractory agent cannot be opposed to the enlargement of the 
coalition.  If this agent is deviating, the instability of the coalition is unavoidable (except 
when monetary transfers on behalf of the non-deviating members are possible). With identical 
agents, this stabilization by transfers is always impossible since all the members of an 
unstable coalition are systematically deviating and therefore cannot finance the transfers. The 
presence of heterogeneous agents shows the possibility for different results in this direction, 
since in an unstable coalition there may be a group of agents who do not deviate either within 
the coalition or within the extended coalition. The proposed game Γ shows the existence of a 
type of agent who does not deviate, whatever the size of the coalition. Without ex-ante 
transfers, the different payoffs inside the coalition can imply that certain agents, particularly 
favored, are never encouraged to leave it, whereas others (losers) are at the origin of its 
instability. These are the members to whom non-deviating agents need to grant ex-post 
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